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DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT
FOLKS: A DIFFERENT STANDARD IS NOT
INHERENTLY A DOUBLE STANDARD*
JAMES E. COLEMAN, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
During the Senate’s closed confirmation hearings on President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s nomination of Charles E. Wilson, president
of General Motors, to be secretary of defense, a senator asked Wilson
if he would be able to make decisions as secretary of defense that
were adverse to General Motors’ interest.1 Wilson replied that he
would, but added he could not imagine having to make such a choice
because “[f]or years I thought what was good for the country was
good for General Motors and vice versa.”2 This bit of rhetorical
bromide was reported erroneously by the press, which had been
excluded from the closed hearing, as the arrogant manifesto of
corporate superiority with which most of us are familiar: “What’s
good for General Motors is good for America.”3
In a similar fashion, Professor Sung Hui Kim has converted the
important but benign amicus support that General Motors and sixtyfive other major American corporations gave to the University of
Michigan in Grutter v. Bollinger4 into a hypocritical “diversity double
standard,” because they allegedly embraced a diversity standard in
Grutter that they would not accept for themselves.5 According to Kim,
* © 2011 James E. Coleman, Jr.
** John S. Bradway Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. SecDef Histories: Charles E. Wilson, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., www.defense.gov/
specials/secdef_histories/bios/wilson.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
2. Id.
3. This misquoted statement also has been erroneously attributed to President
Calvin Coolidge, who actually said, “The chief business of the American people is
business.” President Calvin Coolidge, Address Before the American Society of Newspaper
Editors: The Press Under a Free Government (Jan. 17, 1925), quoted in OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 250 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 7th ed. 2009).
4. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5. Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945, 949 (2011).
Professor Kim also references the simultaneous amicus support in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003), the case that challenged the University of Michigan’s undergraduate
diversity policy. See Kim, supra, at 946. Grutter considered the constitutionality of the
affirmative action program utilized by the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter,
539 U.S. at 311.
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the corporate amici argued “that universities should promote
diversity because it’s good for business,” but did not “make even a
passing reference to the economic self-interest of universities or, for
that matter, any of the significant costs that affirmative action
programs generate for universities.”6 Kim argues, however, that the
very factors the corporate amici ignored in Grutter are central to their
assessment of the appropriateness of diversity for themselves.7
This argument is an unfair characterization of the corporate
amici’s position in Grutter. Those corporations argued only that a
diverse student body such as the one that the University of Michigan
voluntarily pursued in Grutter also serves their corporate interest.
There is nothing in this position that can fairly be characterized as a
diversity standard that might imperil the economic interests of elite
universities or that the corporations were trying to force on unwilling
universities. Professor Kim takes these corporations’ support of the
University of Michigan’s affirmative action program out of the
context of the Grutter litigation. In developing her thesis, she equates
corporations’ pursuit of profits and universities’ pursuit of higher U.S.
News & World Report (“U.S. News”) rankings to argue that the
corporate amici pressed for a costly, inflexible standard of diversity in
Grutter that such corporations generally would not accept for
themselves.
Professor Kim badly misses the mark. There is no double
standard when corporations such as General Motors support in
higher education voluntary diversity that they find beneficial for
business—as the corporate amici did in Grutter—while
simultaneously embracing corporate diversity “only to the extent that
it furthers their economic self-interest.”8 Moreover, there is nothing
in the briefs filed by the corporate amici to suggest that they would
impose upon any university a diversity standard contrary to the
university’s self-interest, which Professor Kim identifies primarily as
“prestige” in the form of higher U.S. News rankings.9 Finally, I also
question the validity of the two assumptions implicit in Professor
Kim’s argument: that diversity inherently undermines a university’s
“prestige” and that there is no credible business case for corporate
diversity that would be consistent with a business corporation’s
economic interest.10
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Kim, supra note 5, at 952 (emphasis added).
Id. at 952–54.
Id. at 952–53.
Id. at 962–63.
See id. at 971.
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I. PROFESSOR KIM’S MANUFACTURED “DIVERSITY DOUBLE
STANDARD”
Professor Kim notes that “distinguished business corporations”
filed two amicus briefs on behalf of the University of Michigan in
Grutter that “loudly affirmed the value of educational diversity to the
business sector.”11 These corporations, General Motors and sixty-five
other self-described “leading American businesses” (“Sixty-five
Leading Businesses”) argued that the racially and ethnically diverse
student bodies that the university pursued in Grutter fit well with
businesses’ need, “at every level of an organization,” for employees,
officers, and directors exposed to “widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints.”12 According to Kim, these amici argued that
the very success of American businesses in a global economy depends
upon their ability “to recruit from a talented pool of racially and
ethnically diverse student bodies.”13 From this, Kim concludes that
“corporate support for educational diversity was premised on the
claim that ‘diversity is good for business,’ ”14 which she calls the
“business case for diversity.”15
Professor Kim argues, however, that this “business case for
[educational] diversity” is not good enough for American business
itself; when it comes to “affirmative action efforts by for-profit
business corporations” to achieve “both workplace diversity and
board diversity,”16 these corporations support diversity “only if the
economic benefits exceed the economic costs to the corporation
itself.”17 Professor Kim contrasts this profit-dependent position on
corporate diversity with what she posits as the corporate amici’s self-

11. Id. at 946.
12. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5–6, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Sixty-five Businesses Brief].
13. Kim, supra note 5, at 947; see Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter GM Brief]; Sixty-five
Businesses Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
14. Kim, supra note 5, at 947 (quoting David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently
Unequal” to “Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity
Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553
(2004)).
15. Id. (quoting David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to
“Diversity is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the
Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004)).
16. Id. at 948.
17. Id.
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centered position on educational diversity, which she claims ignores
the economic burden such a policy places on universities.
Professor Kim acknowledges that, at least superficially, these two
positions are not obviously inconsistent. Both positions are “forwardlooking justifications . . . [,] economic in nature,” and “grounded in
the empirical claim that ‘diversity is good for business.’ ”18 However,
when Professor Kim looks deeper, she finds a “diversity double
standard.” In the case of corporate diversity, the corporate amici (or,
perhaps more accurately, corporations like them) “will support
diversity in the workplace [and in the board room] so long as it makes
money.”19 And the double standard? These same corporations push
educational diversity for elite universities “regardless of the
university’s economic self-interest.”20 These are the sands on which
Professor Kim’s “diversity double standard” rests.
II. THERE IS NO DOUBLE STANDARD INHERENT IN THE POSITION
THAT CORPORATE AMICI TOOK IN GRUTTER AND THE POSITION
THAT CORPORATE DIVERSITY MUST BE BUSINESS JUSTIFIED
As a threshold matter, we must take the corporate amici’s
arguments in Grutter in the context in which they were made. They
were not advocating a position they wanted to impose on the
University of Michigan. Rather, they were supporting the university’s
voluntary position in the litigation. Moreover, their position appears
to have been persuasive; Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion
“seemingly endorsed various business rationales for diversity.”21 In
context, therefore, what the corporate amici did in Grutter was good
for the University of Michigan, based on the university’s own
assessment of its diversity policy.22 Professor Kim mentions this but
ignores it in her analysis. It is helpful, therefore, to note what the
University of Michigan said about the affirmative action program to
which the corporate amici lent their support.

18. Id. at 948–49.
19. Id. at 949.
20. Id. (second emphasis added).
21. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of
the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 797.
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003) (noting that the University of
Michigan Law School “follows an official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student
body diversity . . . [b]y enrolling a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students . . .
to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School’s character and to the legal
profession”); see GM Brief, supra note 13, at 2; Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 12,
at 1.
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In Grutter, the University of Michigan said that its “desire for a
diverse student body is at the very core of its proper institutional
mission.”23 This characterization of its mission is consistent with
Justice Powell’s contention in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke24 that “the cultivation of a diverse and vibrant academic
environment is the most important ‘business of a university.’ ”25 For
the success of this educational business, the University of Michigan
argued that
law schools need the autonomy and discretion to decide that
teaching about the role of race in our society and legal system,
and preparing their students to function effectively as leaders
after graduation, are critically important aspects of their
institutional mission.26
It is not clear where Professor Kim finds in this position evidence
that universities such as Michigan cannot forgo diversity when it no
longer serves their self-interest. The University of Michigan was not
being forced to choose among competing interests in Grutter; rather,
it was defending its right to pursue diversity when it chose to do so.
There was nothing in the Grutter litigation that suggested the
university would have to forego “prestige” to pursue diversity or that
the corporate amici implied such a requirement in their support.
The Sixty-five Leading Businesses and General Motors
participated in Grutter only to offer their own experiences as concrete
evidence that the University of Michigan’s claims about the benefits
of educational diversity were substantial; as the brief of the Sixty-five
Leading Businesses said, “Amici attest to the validity of these claims
through their actions.”27 They had no role in formulating any standard
of diversity for the university; they merely supported a standard that
the university itself advanced. Whether that standard is the same or
different from the standard that business corporations would support
for themselves is irrelevant. Professor Kim is comparing apples and
oranges.
The corporate amici pointed to their own efforts to obtain a
diverse workforce and officer corps as the primary rationale for
intervening into a dispute involving diversity in higher education. The
Sixty-five Leading American Businesses described themselves as
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Brief for Respondents at 28, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Brief for Respondents, supra note 23, at 28 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312).
Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 12, at 8.
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“global businesses that recruit at the University of Michigan or
similar leading institutions of higher education.”28 Collectively, these
corporations hire “thousands of graduates of . . . major public
universities.”29 A diverse student body such as the one the University
of Michigan defended in Grutter “is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and
maintain a diverse workforce, and to employ individuals of all
backgrounds who have been educated and trained in a diverse
environment.”30 In pursuit of that goal, these amici asserted that they
had invested “substantial financial and human resources to create and
maintain a diverse workforce.”31
The amici acknowledged the cost of educational diversity, and
they said they also had devoted substantial resources to support
programs and initiatives to advance racial and ethnic diversity at
Michigan and other major universities.32 There is nothing in the brief
filed by the sixty-five corporations to support Professor Kim’s claim
that these corporations would force elite universities to implement
diversity programs that were not fully in the universities’ self-interest,
however that was defined.
General Motors filed a separate amicus brief, making
substantially the same arguments as the Sixty-five Leading
Businesses. The Michigan-based company said that it “depends upon
the University of Michigan and similarly selective academic
institutions to prepare students for employment—to teach them the
skills required to succeed and lead in the global marketplace.”33
Although the brief may not have waxed eloquent about social justice,
it argued that the “future of American business and, in some
measure, of the American economy depends upon [universities
having the freedom] to select racially and ethnically diverse student
bodies.”34 The brief concluded:
A ruling proscribing the consideration of race and ethnicity in
admissions decisions would dramatically reduce the diversity at
our Nation’s top institutions and thereby deprive the students
who will become the corps of our Nation’s business elite of the
interracial and multicultural interactions in an academic setting
that are so integral to their acquisition of cross-cultural skills.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1–2.
GM Brief, supra note 13, at 1.
Id. at 2.
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Such a ruling also would reduce racial and ethnic diversity in
the pool of employment candidates from which the Nation’s
businesses can draw their future leaders, impeding businesses’
own effort to achieve and obtain the manifold benefits of
diversity in the managerial levels of their work forces.35
The major flaw in Professor Kim’s argument is her assumption
that this position intentionally ignores the economic impact of
diversity on universities. This is a two-step process. First, Kim
criticizes the corporate amici for focusing on the “pressing economic
need for businesses to compete in an increasingly global economic
environment” and sidestepping “any social justice justifications for
diversity, whether framed in corrective justice terms or based on the
indignities of de facto segregation.”36 Second, she concludes that the
“strong implication” from this corporate silence in Grutter is that “it
simply doesn’t matter whether diversity serves or disserves the
economic self-interest of universities. The possibility that it might
hurt the university’s bottom line doesn’t even register.”37 This is
comparable to the journalists who were excluded from the Senate
hearings of Charles Wilson’s nomination to be secretary of defense
writing that Wilson told the senators only that “[w]hat’s good for
General Motors is good for America.” Unlike those reporters,
however, there is no factual basis in anything that the corporate amici
actually wrote in their briefs for what Professor Kim claims is the
“strong implication” that the corporations are indifferent to the
economic impact of diversity on universities.
Understandably, Professor Kim does not explain why the
corporate amici would have discussed the economic impact of
diversity on other interests of the University of Michigan in their
briefs; nobody, let alone the corporate amici, discussed such
consequences. That issue was simply not implicated in the case.
Michigan was seeking only the autonomy and discretion to pursue

35. Id. at 2–3.
36. Kim, supra note 5, at 950–51. The corporate amici did not sidestep such
arguments; rather, such arguments were irrelevant. The Supreme Court long had rejected
such social or historic justifications for voluntary affirmative action. See City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 498–99 (1989) (holding that a state affirmative action
program cannot be justified solely on the ground that it is a remedy to past societal
discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“We have
never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals [without findings of]
constitutional or statutory violations.”). What would have been the point of pressing such
rejected claims in Grutter?
37. Kim, supra note 5, at 952 (emphasis added).
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diversity; it was not being compelled to do so against its will or
interest. This argument, to which Professor Kim devotes a substantial
part of her article, is an attack on a straw man. Even if she is correct
about the economic cost of diversity to the university, so what? All
the University of Michigan has to do to protect its economic
interest—if it is threatened by diversity—is curtail or terminate its
voluntary affirmative action programs.
Professor Kim devotes major attention to what she calls the
“economic cost” of diversity to elite universities such as the
University of Michigan. According to Professor Kim, these costs are
what make the so-called diversity double standard important:
“[M]eaningful affirmative action programs that admit more than
token numbers of underrepresented minorities (including Latinos,
African Americans, and American Indians) generate more economic
costs than economic benefits to universities.”38 The support for this
damning indictment of educational diversity is superficial and
incomplete.
The most significant cost of educational diversity that Professor
Kim identifies is a negative impact on the university’s “prestige,”
which “may hamper the ability of universities to charge premium
tuitions and attract alumni donations.”39 The current, most universal
measure of prestige is the “institutional rankings published by U.S.
News & World Report.”40 Based on the positive impact that a high
ranking has on the quality of students a university is able to attract,
and the amount of additional financial aid a university would have to
provide to attract such students if its rankings slipped, Professor Kim
purports to show an inverse relationship between meaningful
diversity and U.S. News rankings.41
Professor Kim claims empirical support for the proposition that
“a university’s efforts at promoting racial and ethnic diversity beyond
mere tokenism may be at cross-purposes with maintaining or
increasing rankings.”42 The evidence on which she relies is the
familiar literature showing that some racial and ethnic minorities
underperform on the standardized tests on which universities heavily
38. Id. at 959 (footnotes omitted). One might argue that in assessing the costs and
benefits of diversity for public universities, such long-term costs to society are
appropriately considered. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“The
diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education
must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”).
39. Kim, supra note 5, at 959.
40. Id. at 960.
41. See id. at 963–974.
42. Id. at 963.
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rely in admissions. These same test results are also heavily weighted
in U.S. News rankings; therefore, the more of these underperforming
applicants a university admits, the lower its U.S. News ranking will be.
That conclusion assumes a more direct relationship between diversity
and ranking than Kim’s data support; she offers no evidence that the
pursuit of diversity in fact has undermined any university’s U.S. News
ranking. In fact, sticking with U.S. News, one can find evidence for
the opposite conclusion, or at least for the proposition that diversity
and a high ranking appear to be compatible goals.
Professor Kim mentions in passing that U.S. News also ranks
universities and colleges on the basis of their diversity.43 This diversity
index seeks to rank universities based on the racial and ethnic
diversity of their student bodies.
A university is truly diverse if there are many different ethnic
groups enrolled on campus and those groups have around the
same percentage of students enrolled. In other words, if a
college has only one ethnic group that makes up the vast
percentage of its entire student body, it’s not very diverse, even
though it might have many other ethnic groups represented in
small percentages.44
Using an “ethnic diversity mathematical formula,” U.S. News has
created a “diversity index that ranges from 0.0 (entire enrollment is
one racial/ethnic group) to 1.0 (school’s enrollment is equally
distributed over all racial/ethnic groups).”45 The closer a university’s
index score is to 1.0, the more diverse it is.
On the latest diversity index, the most diverse American
university is Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, which has
an index score of 0.74,46 which “means that nearly 3 out of every 4
people you run into [at Rutgers] will be from a different ethnic
group.”47 Only seventeen colleges have a diversity index of 0.7 or

43. Id. at 973 n.120.
44. Bob Morse, Which Colleges Have the Most Student Diversity?, MORSE CODE:
INSIDE THE COLLEGE RANKINGS (Aug. 27, 2009, 2:18 PM), http://www.usnews.com/
blogs/college-rankings-blog/2009/08/27/which-colleges-have-the-most-studentdiversity.html.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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higher.48 Using this index as a measure, it does not obviously appear
that more diversity has a negative impact on a school’s ranking.
The following table sets out the diversity index for the top twenty
universities in the country, based on U.S. News’ most recent list of top
colleges. The average diversity index for the top eleven universities is
0.58, compared to an average of 0.50 for the next nine. Moreover,
within the first group of universities, there is no university with an
index less than 0.51 (the University of Chicago). In the next tier,
however, the lowest index is 0.38 (the University of Notre Dame).
Among the top eleven universities, fourth-ranked Columbia
University has an index of 0.60; fifth-ranked Stanford has an index of
0.68, and seventh-ranked MIT has an index of 0.67, also ranking them
among the most diverse universities in the country.
Table 1: Diversity Index for Top Twenty U.S. Universities
2011 U.S. News Ranking49

2011 Diversity Index50

1. Harvard University
2. Princeton University
3. Yale University
4. Columbia University
5. Stanford University
6. University of Pennsylvania

0.55
0.54
0.55
0.60
0.68
0.56

7. California Institute of Technology
7. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

0.58
0.67

9. Dartmouth College
9. Duke University
9. University of Chicago

0.56
0.58
0.61

12. Northwestern University

0.51

13. John Hopkins University
13. Washington University (St. Louis)

0.55
0.44

48. See id.
49. National Universities Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews
.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/national-universities-rankings (last visited Feb. 12,
2011).
50. Racial Diversity: National Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/national-campus-ethnic-diver
sity (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).

COLEMAN.PTD

2011]

3/30/2011 9:52 AM

DIFFERENT STROKES

1013

15. Brown University
15. Cornell University

0.53
0.48

17. Rice University
17. Vanderbilt University

0.62
0.44

19. University of Notre Dame
20. Emory University

0.38
0.57

Wholly apart from whether Professor Kim is correct in her claim
that real diversity may come at the cost of prestige (in other words, a
higher U.S. News ranking), she fails to show how that claim is
relevant to any issue in Grutter or how it makes the corporate amici
hypocrites for supporting the University of Michigan’s desire to
pursue real diversity. The choice whether to sacrifice prestige for
diversity—if such a choice was presented—was made solely by the
University of Michigan, which voluntarily pursued its affirmative
action program. All that the corporate amici did was offer evidence
that diversity in higher education served their corporate interest,
which apparently was important to some of the Justices who decided
Grutter.
III. A PROFIT-BASED STANDARD FOR CORPORATE DIVERSITY IS
NOT INHERENTLY A BAD STANDARD
Finally, Professor Kim does not even address the principal
implication of her article, that there is no credible business
justification for meaningful corporate diversity.51 The corporate amici
would beg to differ.
In the two briefs filed by the Sixty-five Leading Businesses and
General Motors, the corporate amici put forth clear business
justifications for diversity, based on the assumption that diversity in
their workforces and among their leaders directly contributes to their
business success, especially in the global market. The Sixty-five

51. Kim does not explicitly argue that corporate diversity has been ineffective, but she
cites data intended to refute any suggestion that “diversity is thriving in corporate
America.” Kim, supra note 5, at 955–56. Moreover, if she thought corporate diversity, as
she describes it, was compatible with businesses’ economic interest, her diversity double
standard would be irrelevant. The double standard is noteworthy only if corporate
diversity predicated on business justification has been a failure. Kim does not produce
empirical evidence to support that conclusion, but it is inherent in her diversity double
standard thesis. See id. at 949 (admitting that “one could argue that it is just a different
standard, not deserving of the more pejorative ‘double standard’ label, because the
corporation and university are in such different circumstances”).

COLEMAN.PTD

1014

3/30/2011 9:52 AM

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Leading Businesses wrote that “racial and ethnic diversity in
institutions of higher education is vital to amici’s efforts to hire and
maintain a diverse workforce, and to employ individuals of all
backgrounds who have been educated and trained in a diverse
environment.”52 According to these amici, “such a workforce is
important to amici’s continued success in the global marketplace.”53
The global importance of a diverse workforce reflects the world in
which American businesses must operate: “[T]he increasingly global
reach of American business, [and] the skills and training needed to
succeed in business today demand exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas and viewpoints.”54 As a result, “[e]mployees at every
level of an organization must be able to work effectively with people
who are different from themselves.”55 In sum, American corporations
need a “workforce that is as diverse as the world around it.”56
General Motors also based its support for diversity in higher
education on its need for a diverse workforce that can compete in a
global market.57 But the company also argued that diversity was
important domestically, as the American population becomes
increasingly diverse. As that process accelerates, the
capacity of many businesses to recruit and retain talented
labor—a critical resource—therefore increasingly will depend
upon the sensitivity of their managers to interracial and
multicultural issues. “Companies with strong records for
developing and advancing minorities and women will find it
easier to recruit [and retain] members of those groups.”58
According to General Motors, workplace diversity also improves
creativity and productivity: “The best ideas and products are created
by teams of people who can work together without prejudice or
discomfort.”59 Based on that principle, General Motors created
a “walls down” work environment to foster “idea flow”—an
interactive process of creative brainstorming unhindered by
titles and positions. Idea flow cannot be achieved across

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 12, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
See GM Brief, supra note 13, at 12–17.
Id. at 15 (quoting FED. GLASS CEILING COMM’N, A SOLID INVESTMENT:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 4 (1995)).
59. Id. at 15–16.
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barriers of racial and cultural discomfort or among team
members who are unable to accept diverse views.60
General Motor’s rationale for corporate diversity finds
theoretical support in a recent article by Tristin Green.61 Professor
Green’s thesis is that the use of race and gender to organize how
employees, managers, and directors work and who does the work also
promotes nondiscrimination when employment decisions are “part of
an employer’s broader integrative effort, an effort comprised of
various structural reforms that are likely to foster functional
integration and reduce workplace discrimination.”62 This argument is
very similar to the University of Michigan’s rationale for diversity in
higher education: people who work and learn together as peers are
less likely to be divided by race and gender in their daily activities and
are less likely to make decisions based on race and gender or to act on
racial or sexual stereotypes.63 Indeed, that also appears to be the
rationale for General Motors’ “walls down” work environment.
It is not easy to achieve meaningful diversity in higher education
or corporate America. Like the University of Michigan in Grutter,
however, the corporate amici argued that diversity was critical to their
core mission, not an ancillary luxury. Kim assumes that is not true.
Rather, she implies—as she argues in the case of diversity in higher
education—that meaningful diversity can be achieved only at the
expense of corporate profitability. But Kim fails to make that case;
consequently, her claim of a diversity double standard lacks traction.
CONCLUSION
Professor Kim’s claim that American corporations such as those
that supported the University of Michigan in Grutter v. Bollinger
were endorsing a standard of diversity that they would not support
for themselves is an unfair characterization of the corporate amici’s
position in Grutter. They did not independently advance any standard
for diversity in higher education. Instead, they offered their own
business experiences in support of the standard of voluntary diversity
that the University of Michigan had adopted. It is naive to think that
universities will pursue diversity when it is not in their interest to do
so, just as it is naive to expect businesses to pursue diversity “ ‘for its
60. Id. at 16.
61. Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: “Diversity,” Discrimination,
and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585, 585 (2010).
62. Id. at 591.
63. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 23, at 22–26.
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own sake,’ ”64 whatever that implies. Professor Kim seems to have no
faith that diversity and a high U.S. News ranking can coexist or that
workplace diversity and profits can coexist. But, as General Motors
actually argued in its brief in Grutter, diversity that is good for the
University of Michigan is good for General Motors, and vice versa.

64. Kim, supra note 5, at 948 (quoting CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE
PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BD., BOARD DIVERSITY IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST
PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF CORPORATE BOARDS 7 (1999)).

